Comment Paper -- Disability and Conceptions of Adulthood

Disability and Conceptions of Adulthood
Goble, Colin (2004). Dependence, Independence and Normality, pp 41-46 in John Swain, Sally French,
Colin Barnes and Carol Tjomas (eds.). Disabling Barriers – Enabling Environments, 2nd Edition (London: Sage).
Priestly, Mark (2003). Disability: A Life Course Approach. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Ch 5 pp. 116-142

What defines an independent person? At first, a hegemonic conception of the term may include doing what a person wants, when a person wants, and usually by themselves, or without help from another person. However, in our society, where everyone is actually interdependent, is that really what independence consists of? Independence can be defined in a number of ways; both Goble and Priestly contrast a professional - mainstream view with a disabled person’s conception of what it may be.
Goble first outlines what he calls a professional conception of independence. This is a definition that is based completely on the medical model of disability: if your body is not fully functional, and you are not able to care for yourself, you are not independent. “The assumption is that the problem lies within the individual, and the response is technical intervention by skilled ‘expert’ professionals to help the person overcome it and return to an approximation of ‘normality’,” (Goble, 2004), with ‘normality’ as having a fully functioning body for which you are capable of caring for yourself. However, from this definition, no person in society can be considered truly independent, as everyone relies on other people in their social networks for something; for instance, a significant other or other family members and friends provide emotional or financial support when it is needed. We also rely on the professionals, on people who work in stores, our coworkers, and the list continues. Our society, contrary to hegemonic beliefs, is interdependent in that we are always in need of social networks. Complete independence is not possible with the medical model definition then.
Goble gives a definition of independence from a disabled person’s perspective as well: “From this perspective then, independence is about rights, access and control rather than functional capacity,” (Goble, 2004). This definition makes more sense in reference to our society as it allows for interdependence at the same time as independence. Goble reiterates that the autonomy and privacy of the individual are key for independence; without the right to control your own financial situation or healthcare treatments, what can you control? The lack of this control would leave a person feeling very dependent and unworthy of status in society, which is part of the oppression disabled people are subjected to more often than not.
As Goble asserts his definitions of independence, Priestly applies them to adulthood as a social status. He makes the argument that adult social status comes with both rights and responsibilities that both disabled persons and those considered older can be excluded from, because of their perceived incompetence. However, who decides who is competent? This reiterates the concept of professional control in society. In this section, Priestly explains the generational system as having three parts: childhood, where people are dependent on their parents, adulthood, where independence is finally found, and old age, where people are dependent on their care-givers once again. He also explains that disabled people have a difficult time fitting into these generational categories when the definition being followed is the hegemonic medical model. People with impairments are seen as dependent, and so never reach the adulthood stage, but get thrown into the old age stage: “dependency and impairment are regarded as ‘childlike’ states… exclusion maintains the dependency of children and older people, and reproduces their generational marginality from adulthood,”(Priestly, 2003). Applying this to disabled people is not a difficult task: when rights and control are denied, exclusion ensures the dependency of disabled people, and removes their adult status.
Priestly reiterates Goble’s argument of our society not actually being independent with a quote from Oliver: “in reality, of course, no one in a modern industrial society is completely independent: we live in a state of mutual interdependence,” (1989, in Priestly, 2003). He also explains that without interdependency, independence will not be understood: “when the human condition is viewed as one of interdependency and vulnerability, this leads to an understanding of independence and ‘partnership’.”(Reindal, 1999, in Priestly, 2003).
In his second section, Priestly outlines parenting as an example of independence. I thought that this section went along with the documentary “The Sterilization of Leilani Muir”. Because of perceived incompetence instead of the realization that all that is needed is a little bit of extra support, sterilization occurs, along with a long list of children being placed into alternate homes. I was surprised at the number of children being removed from their families because of a learning disability. Once again, who is entitled to decide a person’s competency?
“The ability to work is the primary criterion that states use to define who is disabled” (Priestly, 2003). The last section of Priestly’s article outlines what work means to independence. Work is a status symbol for the status of adulthood: once a person hits a certain age, they are old enough to have the responsibility of work. Disabled people, however, are often excluded from this status and responsibility because of physical challenges. He argues that changes in the structures of adult labour markets are the cause of the social category of disability in capitalist societies. To explain, those who are disabled are deemed unfit to work, and are not usually employed. However, when there are circumstances that warrant it, such as war, or an economic boom where more workers are needed, those same disabled people will be given a job. This makes disability elastic, and promotes the exclusion of these people from the work force, removing, again, the social status of adulthood.
The similarities in the two arguments involve the argument for moving away from the traditional medical model definition of physical capabilities as independence and towards a definition that focuses on rights, access and control. Priestly expands on Goble’s definitions with extra examples, however, Goble seems to take into account the attempt for professionals in society to work in alliance with the disabled, where Priestly seems to only state the negative.
In conclusion, the hegemonic definition of independence needs to change before the rights, access and control of disabled people and those who are aged will be acknowledged. Our society needs to realize that, along with independence, we should be valuing interdependence, because it is such a large part of our lives.